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Until recently, it has been thought that under interocular suppression high-level visual pro-
cessing is strongly inhibited if not abolished. With the development of continuous ﬂash
suppression (CFS), a variant of binocular rivalry, this notion has now been challenged by
a number of reports showing that even high-level aspects of visual stimuli, such as famil-
iarity, affect the time stimuli need to overcome CFS and emerge into awareness. In this
“breaking continuous ﬂash suppression” (b-CFS) paradigm, differential unconscious pro-
cessing during suppression is inferred when (a) speeded detection responses to initially
invisible stimuli differ, and (b) no comparable differences are found in non-rivalrous control
conditions supposed to measure non-speciﬁc threshold differences between stimuli. The
aim of the present study was to critically evaluate these assumptions. In six experiments
we compared the detection of upright and inverted faces. We found that not only under
CFS, but also in control conditions upright faces were detected faster and more accurately
than inverted faces, although the effect was larger during CFS. However, reaction time
(RT) distributions indicated critical differences between the CFS and the control condition.
When RT distributions werematched, similar effect sizes were obtained in both conditions.
Moreover, subjective ratings revealed that CFS and control conditions are not perceptually
comparable. These ﬁndings cast doubt on the usefulness of non-rivalrous control condi-
tions to rule out non-speciﬁc threshold differences as a cause of shorter detection latencies
during CFS.Thus, at least in its present form, the b-CFS paradigm cannot provide unequiv-
ocal evidence for unconscious processing under interocular suppression. Nevertheless,
our ﬁndings also demonstrate that the b-CFS paradigm can be fruitfully applied as a highly
sensitive device to probe differences between stimuli in their potency to gain access to
awareness.
Keywords: continuous flash suppression, interocular suppression, binocular rivalry, unconscious processing, visual
awareness, face inversion
INTRODUCTION
The degree to which stimuli are processed without conscious
awareness is of fundamental importance to our understanding
of the visual system. An answer to this question requires both
a psychophysical method to render stimuli invisible and a mea-
sure sensitive to unconscious processing. Binocular rivalry (BR)
offers a particularly elegant way to erase a visual stimulus from
awareness, because during BR perception spontaneously ﬂuctu-
ates between two dissimilar images presented concurrently to the
two eyes (e.g., Kim and Blake, 2005; Tong et al., 2006; Sterzer
et al., 2009b). Recently, Jiang et al. (2007) introduced a promising
new method aimed at uncovering preserved processing of stimuli
rendered invisible by such interocular suppression.A rapidly grow-
ing number of studies applying this “breaking continuous ﬂash
suppression” (b-CFS) technique now suggest that many high-level
stimulus properties can be processed without visual awareness,
something traditionally thought not to be possible under inte-
rocular suppression. The b-CFS method uses a direct measure of
conscious perception to infer unconscious processing, namely the
time it takes a stimulus to be detected.
THE DISSOCIATION PARADIGM FOR MEASURING UNCONSCIOUS
PROCESSING
In the majority of studies on unconscious visual processing, a
directmeasure of conscious awareness of a stimulus (e.g.,detection
performance) is compared to an indirect measure of unconscious
processing of the same stimulus (e.g., priming effect). Uncon-
scious processing is commonly inferred when the indirect measure
exhibits some sensitivity to the same stimulus information to
which the direct measure is insensitive. Applying this dissociation
logic (Erdelyi, 1986),many studies found that basic stimulus prop-
erties such as orientation, spatial frequency, color, or translational
motion are still encoded when rendered invisible by interocu-
lar suppression (for a comprehensive review, see Lin and He,
2009). While such low-level stimulus properties can be processed
unconsciously during suppression, it has remained unclear towhat
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extent higher-level aspects of visual stimuli, such as familiarity or
category membership, can be extracted without awareness under
such viewing conditions. Evidence from indirect measures such as
priming effects or high-level aftereffects suggests that only certain
stimulus attributes related to emotional facial expressions (Adams
et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2011; but see Yang et al., 2010), highly
arousing stimuli (Jiang et al., 2006; Yan et al., 2009), manipula-
ble objects (Almeida et al., 2008, 2010; also see Roseboom and
Arnold, 2011), and numerical information (Bahrami et al., 2010)
can escape suppression and transpire in subcortical areas (Pasley
et al., 2004;Williams et al., 2004; Jiang and He, 2006) and along the
dorsal cortical pathway (Fang and He, 2005; but see Hesselmann
and Malach, 2011), respectively.
By contrast, priming effects triggered by stimuli known to be
processed in ventral cortical areas, such aswords (Zimba andBlake,
1983), line drawings of objects (Cave et al., 1998), and images of
vehicles and animals (Almeida et al., 2008, 2010) are eliminated
by interocular suppression. Similarly, invisible faces fail to induce
facial identity, gender, race, and face shape aftereffects (Moradi
et al., 2005; Amihai et al., 2011; Stein and Sterzer, 2011). These
psychophysical ﬁndings dovetail with neural responses in the ven-
tral stream being virtually eliminated under suppression (Shein-
berg and Logothetis, 1997; Tong et al., 1998; Pasley et al., 2004;
Williams et al., 2004; Fang and He, 2005; Hesselmann and Malach,
2011).Only recently, signatures of preservedprocessingdifferences
between suppressed faces andhouses have beendetected in distrib-
uted activation patterns in category-selective areas of the ventral
stream and in magnetoencephalographic markers related to face
processing (Sterzer et al., 2008, 2009a). However, it is currently
unknown whether such residual traces of activity can inﬂuence
overt behavior or whether they are purely “epiphenomenal,” i.e.,
unrelated to task performance (cf. Williams et al., 2007).
All of these studies examined unconscious processing during
interocular suppression using some implementation of the dis-
sociation paradigm. While intuitively appealing, it is important
to note that the dissociation logic has faced repeated theoret-
ical and methodological challenges. For example, there is little
consensus on the nature of a direct measure that validly indexes
conscious awareness (Cheesman and Merikle, 1986; Draine and
Greenwald, 1998; Seth et al., 2008). Even more, it has been ques-
tioned whether it is possible at all to devise a direct measure
which is sensitive to all aspects of conscious information that
might inﬂuence performance on the indirect task (Reingold and
Merikle, 1988). Conversely, because objective measures of stimu-
lus awareness such as detectability are (at least partly) mediated
by unconscious processes, display parameters that yield chance
performance in the direct measure may eliminate not only con-
scious, but also unconscious information (Merikle and Reingold,
1992). Therefore, the dissociation paradigm may underestimate
the extent of unconscious processing. In light of these potential
problems, it is important to consider alternative approaches to
unconscious processing.
BREAKING CONTINUOUS FLASH SUPPRESSION
A fundamentally different strategy exploits the temporal dynamics
of perceptual ﬂuctuations during BR. Research on the inﬂuence
of higher-level stimulus aspects on the dynamics of BR has a long
tradition (for a review of earlier ﬁndings, see Walker, 1978). In
most of these studies, observers continuously tracked periods of
perceptual dominance of the two stimuli presented concurrently
to the two eyes. Such measures of subjective dominance have
revealed that familiar, meaningful, or emotional stimuli predomi-
nate more than do unfamiliar, less meaningful, or non-emotional
stimuli (e.g., Engel, 1956; Yu and Blake, 1992; Alpers and Gerdes,
2007). However, with regard to unconscious processing these
ﬁndings remain inconclusive, as increased predominance could
be due to perceptual enhancement during dominance and does
not necessarily imply enhanced unconscious processing during
suppression.
By directly measuring the duration of perceptual suppression
for familiar and unfamiliar stimuli, Jiang et al. (2007) broke new
grounds in addressing the question of whether high-level stimulus
properties can remain effective during interocular suppression. To
reliably suppress stimuli at the beginning of a trial, Jiang et al.
(2007) made use of continuous ﬂash suppression (CFS), a variant
of BR in which dynamic Mondrian-like masks ﬂashed to one eye
render stimuli presented to the other eye invisible for extended
periods of time (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005)1. For example, in
their ﬁrst experiment, Jiang et al. (2007) presented an upright
or inverted face to one eye, while CFS masks were ﬂashed to
the other eye. Observers indicated as fast as possible on which
side of ﬁxation any part of the face emerged from suppression.
Results revealed a face inversion effect (FIE), i.e., longer response
times (RTs) for inverted than for upright faces. Since upright and
inverted faces consist of identical features, the FIE was interpreted
as reﬂecting preserved higher-level processing differences under
rivalry suppression.
Following this interpretation, results from recent studies
could be taken as evidence that this breaking continuous ﬂash
suppression (b-CFS) paradigm is extremely sensitive to uncon-
scious processes. Suppression durations are not only modulated
by face inversion (Jiang et al., 2007; Zhou et al., 2010a) or word
familiarity (Jiang et al., 2007), but also by emotional facial expres-
sions (Yang et al., 2007; Tsuchiya et al., 2009; Sterzer et al., 2011),
eye gaze (Stein et al., 2011), emotional words (Yang andYeh, 2011),
semantic priming (Costello et al., 2009), natural scene content
(Mudrik et al., 2011), and even by concurrently presented odors
(Zhou et al., 2010b). Clearly, these b-CFS ﬁndings challenge the
previous notion that higher-level inﬂuences on the dynamics of BR
are restricted to dominance periods alone (Blake and Logothetis,
2002).
ISOLATING CFS-SPECIFIC UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSING
Most b-CFS studies have attributed differences in suppression
durations to differential unconscious processing during rivalry
suppression, i.e., to CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing differ-
ences. CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing means that uncon-
scious processing is present because CFS is applied to selectively
1In fact, it is not yet clear whether CFS should be regarded as a variant of BR that
induces particularly strong suppression (Shimaoka and Kaneko, 2011), or whether
CFS is supported by mechanisms distinct from BR (Tsuchiya et al., 2006). For the
purpose of the present article, we follow the currently common practice (e.g., Lin
and He, 2009) and use CFS and rivalry suppression interchangeably.
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interrupt conscious processing while leaving some unconscious
processing intact. However, shorter suppression durations, for
example for more familiar stimuli, could also be caused by gen-
erally lower thresholds for conscious detection independent of
CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing. Under normal viewing con-
ditions the threshold for conscious detection is determined pri-
marily by the speed of visual processing, which is typically very
fast, but slowed under difﬁcult viewing conditions, for example in
cluttered displays. To isolate the effect of CFS-speciﬁc unconscious
processing it is necessary to exclude such non-speciﬁc threshold
differences as a cause for differences in suppression durations. In
addition, because b-CFS studies used RTs to record suppression
durations, variable response criteria could also distort the results,
especially in states of partial awareness around threshold.
Jiang et al. (2007) were aware of these alternative explana-
tions and designed a non-rivalrous binocular control condition
intended to perceptually resemble the CFS condition, assuming
that non-speciﬁc threshold differences should equally unfold in
this control condition (Figure 1). In the control condition, partic-
ipants detected the same stimuli as in the CFS condition, but no
interocular suppression was induced as the stimuli were gradually
blended in binocularly on top of the CFS masks (see Figure 2).
Following the logic of comparing the CFS condition to such a
control condition, the absence of RT differences in the control
condition would imply that only CFS-speciﬁc unconscious pro-
cessing differences could have caused RT differences in the CFS
condition. Thus, the interpretation of any b-CFS study depends
critically on the outcome of the control condition (Figure 1).
To illustrate, in Experiment 1 by Jiang et al. (2007), no FIE was
found in the control condition. This was interpreted as demon-
strating that the FIE in the CFS condition could not have been
due to a non-speciﬁc detection advantage for upright faces, but
was caused by CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing differences.
Had the control condition yielded an FIE of comparable size, the
conclusionwouldhave been that both theCFS and the control con-
dition reﬂect a detection advantage for upright relative to inverted
faces.
Taken together, the b-CFSparadigmrepresents a fundamentally
new approach to the measure of unconscious processing. Unlike
the classic dissociation paradigm, the b-CFS paradigm does not
compare a direct measure of conscious perception to an indirect
measure of unconscious processing. Instead, two direct measures
of differences in detection performance are compared, obtained
during CFS and during a binocular control condition, to draw
conclusions about CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing.
If an effect is observed in the CFS condition only, this is attrib-
uted to CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing. For this reasoning
to be valid, the logic behind b-CFS presupposes that the control
condition captures or “emulates” all processes that are not CFS-
speciﬁc, but were involved in mediating a difference in stimulus
detection in the CFS condition (Figure 1).
In light of the importance of the control condition for inter-
preting b-CFS results, it is of note that all previous b-CFS studies
demonstrated a null effect in this control condition (Jiang et al.,
2007; Costello et al., 2009; Zhou et al., 2010a; Mudrik et al., 2011;
Stein et al., 2011; Yang and Yeh, 2011). We found the consis-
tently observed absence of RT differences in the control condition
FIGURE 1 | Flowchart illustrating the logic underlying the b-CFS
paradigm. If no control condition is included, no conclusions about
CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing differences can be drawn, as the
effect obtained under CFS could be due to non-speciﬁc differences in
detection thresholds. From the comparison of the effect obtained under
CFS to the effect obtained in the control condition, CFS-speciﬁc
unconscious processing can only be inferred if (a) the effect in the CFS
condition is larger than the effect in the control condition, and, critically, (b)
the CFS and the control condition are actually comparable in the sense that
the control condition emulates all processes that are not CFS-speciﬁc, but
were involved in mediating a difference in stimulus detection in the CFS
condition.
surprising, as most b-CFS studies compared suppression dura-
tions for stimuli (e.g., upright vs. inverted faces, fearful vs. neutral
faces, emotional vs. non-emotional words, or direct vs. averted
gaze) that have frequently been found to differ in their detectabil-
ity in a range of paradigms not involving BR, such as visual search,
backward masking, or the attentional blink.
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FIGURE 2 | Schematics of example trials from (A) the CFS condition and
(B) the control condition in Experiments 1–3. (A) In the CFS condition,
high-contrast Mondrian-like masks ﬂashing at 10Hz were presented to one
eye, while a face stimulus was gradually introduced to the other eye. (B) In
the control condition, the masks and the face stimulus were presented
binocularly and the face was blended in transparently on top of the masks. In
Experiments 1 and 2, participants were asked to indicate as fast
and accurately as possible on which side of ﬁxation the face or
any part of the face became visible. In Experiment 3, presentation durations
were ﬁxed and subjects were required to indicate as accurately as
possible, without speed pressure, on which side of ﬁxation the face was
shown.
THE PRESENT STUDY
We focused on the advantage of upright over inverted faces in
overcoming CFS as an exemplary and consistent b-CFS ﬁnding
(Jiang et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2007; Zhou et al., 2010a; Stein et al.,
2011). The absence of an FIE in the control condition (Jiang et al.,
2007; Zhou et al., 2010a) appears at odds with the well-established
presence of an FIE in a variety of other detection paradigms under
normal binocular viewing conditions (Purcell and Stewart, 1988;
Aguirre et al., 1999; Lewis and Edmonds, 2003, 2005; Rousselet
et al., 2003; Latinus and Taylor, 2006; Tyler and Chen, 2006; Van-
Rullen, 2006;Chen et al., 2008;Garrido et al., 2008; for a review, see
Lewis and Ellis, 2003). Intrigued by this discrepancy, we started off
trying to replicate the results reported in the seminal b-CFS study
by Jiang et al. (2007). Building up on this, we carried out a series of
additional experiments intended to test the validity of the b-CFS
paradigm. In particular, we examined whether the comparison
between the CFS and the control condition can indeed be relied
upon to isolate CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing. We use face
inversion only as an example, but the conclusions we draw are
relevant for and extend to all applications of the b-CFS paradigm.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, we set out to replicate the results obtained by
Jiang et al. (2007). Accordingly, visual stimuli, stimulus size, and
experimental setup of Experiment 1 followed the description of
their research. To increase sensitivity for detecting an FIE in the
control condition we examined a larger sample of subjects and
tested all participants both in theCFS and in the control condition.
We expected upright faces to be detected faster than inverted faces.
The critical question was whether this FIE would be restricted to
the CFS condition, as reported by Jiang et al. (2007), or whether
an FIE would also be present in the control condition.
In addition, we asked whether both conditions were actually
comparable in the sense that the control condition emulated
all critical factors that could have contributed to a detection
advantage for upright faces in the CFS condition. As a ﬁrst
approach to this question, we explored differences between the RT
distributions from the two conditions.MostRTanalyses, including
all previous b-CFS studies, evaluate a measure of central tendency
of the RT distribution only, such as mean RT. Following Jiang et al.
(2007), we sought to obtain roughly equal mean RTs in the CFS
and in the control condition. However, limiting data analysis to
a measure of central tendency can conceal important differences
between conditions that can only be revealed by an analysis of the
full RT distribution (e.g., Ratcliff, 1979; Hockley, 1984; Heathcote
et al., 1991).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-four observers (15 female, mean age 28.7 years) partici-
pated in Experiment 1. In all experiments, participants were paid,
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naïve to the
purpose of the study. The study was approved by the Charité
ethics committee and informed consent was obtained from all
participants.
Apparatus
InExperiment 1 and in all further experiments,visual displayswere
presented on a 19-in Samsung CRT monitor (1024× 768 pixels
resolution, 60Hz frame rate). Observers viewed a pair of dichoptic
displays through a custom-built mirror stereoscope, with the sub-
jects’ heads stabilized by a chin-and-head rest. The effective view-
ing distance was 50 cm. To promote stable binocular alignment,
the mirrors were adjusted for each observer. Visual stimuli were
presented with Matlab (The MathWorks,Natick,MA,USA), using
the Cogent 2000 toolbox (www.vislab.ucl.ak.uk/cogent.php).
Stimuli and procedure
Stimuli were displayed against a gray background. During the
whole experiment two black frames (10.9˚ × 10.9˚) were pre-
sented side by side on the screen, such that one frame was visible
to each eye. In the center of each frame a black central ﬁxa-
tion cross (0.7˚× 0.7˚) was displayed. Observers were asked to
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maintain stable ﬁxation throughout each experimental block. In
all experiments, face stimuli were 10 photographs (ﬁve female,
2.1˚× 2.6˚) and their vertical inversions derived from theNimStim
face stimulus set (Tottenham et al., 2009).
Each trial started with a 1-s presentation of the ﬁxation cross
and the black frame only. In the CFS condition, colored high-
contrast Mondrian-like CFS masks (similar to those used by Jiang
et al., 2007; cf. Sterzer et al., 2008, 2009a) measuring 10˚× 10˚
were ﬂashed to one eye at a frequency of 10Hz, while a face stim-
ulus was introduced to the other eye (see Figure 2). The face was
presented either to the left or to the right of the ﬁxation cross, at
a random location within the area corresponding to the location
of the CFS masks. The contrast of the face stimulus was ramped
up linearly from 0 to 100% (i.e., to its original contrast) within a
period of 1 s from the beginning of the trial and then remained
constant until the participant had made a response. In the control
condition, CFS masks and face stimuli were presented binocularly.
Face stimuli were gradually blended into the masks by reducing
their transparency linearly from 100 to 0% within a period of 2.5 s
from the trial’s beginning.
We informed participants that both upright and inverted faces
would be presented and asked them to press the left or the right
arrow key on the keyboard to indicate as fast and accurately as
possible on which side of ﬁxation a face or any part of it appeared2.
Design
Observers viewed one block containing 120 CFS trials and one
block of 120 control trials. Within each block all possible combi-
nations of face orientation (upright, inverted), two eyes for face
presentation (only for the CFS condition, in the control condition
face stimuli were always presented binocularly) and ten face exem-
plars were presented equally often and trial order was randomized.
Block order was counterbalanced across participants.
Analysis
Trials with erroneous responses or RTs longer than 10 s were dis-
carded (cf. Jiang et al., 2007). In total, less than 2% of all trials for
each subject were excluded from the analysis.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Upright vs. inverted faces
Mean RTs were analyzed by a repeated measures ANOVA with the
factors condition (CFS, control) and face orientation (upright,
inverted). There was a trend for a main effect of condition,
F(1, 23)= 3.50, p = 0.074, and a signiﬁcant main effect of face
orientation, F(1, 23)= 27.49, p< 0.001, which was qualiﬁed by
a signiﬁcant interaction between condition and face orienta-
tion, F(1, 23)= 13.13, p = 0.001, indicating a larger FIE in the
2It is possible that this instruction slightly deviated from the study by Jiang et al.
(2007) who instructed observers to “respond to the appearance of any part of the
test image [emphasis added].” We informed participants about the presentation of
faces as test images, because we found it difﬁcult to instruct naïve participants to
discriminate a“test image” from the CFS masks without further specifying what that
test image distinguishes from the random shapes constituting the mask. Moreover,
even when instructed to detect a test image, participants would realize after a few
trials that the test image set consisted only of upright and inverted faces. We there-
fore do not believe that this possible difference to the study by Jiang et al. (2007)
could have affected our results.
CFS than in the control condition (see Figure 3A). Importantly,
however, the FIE was not only signiﬁcant in the CFS condi-
tion, t (23)= 4.53, p< 0.001, but also in the control condition,
t (23)= 4.33, p< 0.001.
The reliable FIE in the control condition indicates that different
detection thresholds or criteria for upright and inverted faces that
are not speciﬁc to CFS do exist in the b-CFS paradigm. Still, the
FIE was larger in the CFS condition. One possibility is that this
increase in FIE size reﬂected CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing
differences between upright and inverted faces. Alternatively, there
might have been other factors that differed between the CFS and
the control condition and that could have caused the increased FIE
in the CFS condition.
CFS vs. control condition
Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests (KS-tests) demonstrated signiﬁcant
differences between the RT distributions from the CFS and the
control condition for each individual subject (all ps< 0.001). To
visualize these differences in the shape of RT distributions, we
plotted group cumulative RT distributions comparing the two
conditions (Figure 4A). For each subject and each condition,
we computed the RTs corresponding to the 5th to 95th per-
centiles at 5% intervals which were then averaged across subjects.
This method preserves the shape of the individual RT distribu-
tions (e.g., Thomas and Ross, 1980; Mordkoff and Yantis, 1991).
Figure 4A shows that the CFS distribution had more spread and
a considerably longer right tail, reﬂecting increased RT variabil-
ity and a larger number of trials with particularly long RTs. This
enhanced RT variability was also reﬂected in a signiﬁcantly larger
mean coefﬁcient of variation (CV, SD divided by the mean) in the
CFS condition compared to the control condition, t (23)= 13.88,
p< 0.001 (Figure 3B).
To examine which aspects of the distributions were inﬂu-
enced by face inversion and whether face inversion affected the
CFS and the control distributions differently, we again used the
FIGURE 3 | (A) Mean RTs from Experiment 1. In this and all further graphs
depicting mean RTs, positive and negative error bars represent 95%
conﬁdence intervals for the paired comparison between upright and
inverted faces within each condition. (B) Mean coefﬁcients of variation (CV;
SD divided by the mean) from Experiment 1. In this and all further graphs
depicting CVs, positive and negative error bars denote 95% conﬁdence
intervals for the paired comparison between the CFS and the control
condition.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 167 | 5
Stein et al. Breaking continuous ﬂash suppression
FIGURE 4 | (A) Cumulative group distributions of RTs from the CFS and the
control condition in Experiment 1.We obtained the RTs corresponding to the
5th to 95th percentiles at 5% intervals from each subject’s individual
cumulative RT distributions. These percentile estimates were then averaged
across subjects to create group average RT distributions (Thomas and Ross,
1980; Mordkoff andYantis, 1991). In this and all further graphs depicting
cumulative group distributions, the shaded areas represent 95% conﬁdence
intervals generated by bootstrapping (Mack et al., 2009). (B,C) Size of the FIE
as a function of percentiles, plotted separately for the (B) CFS and the (C)
control condition.Within each condition, we ﬁrst created separate group
average RT distributions for trials with upright and inverted faces and then
computed the FIE (RT inverted–RT upright) at each percentile. In this and all
further graphs depicting the FIE at separate percentiles, the shaded areas
depict the 95% conﬁdence intervals for the FIE at each percentile.
percentile averaging method to compare RTs to upright and
inverted faces at each of the 5th to 95th percentile (spaced at
5% intervals; Figures 4A,C). Over the bulk of the distribu-
tions from both conditions, RTs were shorter for upright faces.
However, in the control condition the FIE had a similar size
across the full distribution (Figure 4C). By contrast, in the CFS
condition, the size of the FIE increased toward the right tail
of the distribution (Figure 4B). Correspondingly, linear regres-
sion analyses demonstrated that the slope for the CFS condition
was signiﬁcantly more positive than for the control condition,
F(1, 34)= 44.73, p< 0.001. Thus, trials with exceptionally long
RTs (which were virtually absent in the control condition, see
Figure 4A) strongly contributed to the increased FIE in the CFS
condition.
Interpretation of distributional differences
Although differences in RT distributions cannot unequivocally be
related to speciﬁc underlying perceptual or cognitive processes,
it is widely accepted that differences in distributional parameters
other than the mean can reﬂect important differences between
experimental conditions (e.g., Luce, 1986; Heathcote et al., 1991).
Thus, the striking differences in distribution shape may indicate
that the control condition failed to emulate all perceptual and cog-
nitive factors (other than CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing)
that were involved in the CFS condition. If true, it would be prob-
lematic to rely on the results from the control condition to draw
conclusions about the processes underlying the effects obtained in
the CFS condition.
The most prominent difference between both conditions was
the greatly increased RT variability in the CFS condition. One
possibility is that this increased RT variability was driven by
stochastic variations in the dynamics of BR (e.g., Levelt, 1965;
Fox and Herrmann, 1967; Kim et al., 2006). This variability
in perceptual dominance of the face stimulus would inevitably
introduce temporal uncertainty with regard to the time of face
appearance during CFS. By contrast, in the control block the
appearance of the face could easily be anticipated, since the face
stimuli were faded in at a constant rate. One concern is that dif-
ferent uncertainties with regard to face appearance could have
led subjects to adopt different strategies for detecting faces in
both conditions. Different strategies could then, for example,
have shifted response criteria in a way that yielded different FIE
sizes.
In the following two experiments, we examined whether the
increased FIE in the CFS condition resulted from unconscious
processing or from other differences between the CFS and the
control condition, such as different strategies (Experiment 2) or
response criteria (Experiment 3).
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, we mixed CFS and control trials within the same
blocks, instead of separating them into distinct pure blocks as
done in previous b-CFS studies on the FIE (Jiang et al., 2007;
Zhou et al., 2010a). This simple change in experimental design
was introduced to attenuate any difference in temporal uncertainty
regarding face appearance. We were concerned that differences in
temporal uncertainty would lead subjects to adopt different strate-
gies in CFS and control blocks. The impact of different strategies
associated with different experimental conditions is known to be
ampliﬁed when experimental conditions are separated into dis-
tinct pure blocks, even in simple perceptual tasks (e.g., Sperling
and Dosher, 1986; Los, 1996). Therefore, if strategic differences
contributed to the difference in FIE size, this inﬂuence should be
reduced in a mixed design.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A new set of 24 observers (20 female, mean age 23.4 years)
participated in Experiment 2.
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Design
Participants completed 320 trials separated by four breaks: each
combination of two conditions, two face orientations, two eyes for
face presentation, and ten face identities occurred equally often
and trial order was randomized.
Analysis
Incorrect trials and RTs longer than 10 s were discarded (less than
2% of all trials for each subject).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Upright vs. inverted faces
A repeated measures ANOVA on mean RTs revealed a trend
for a main effect of condition, F(1, 23)= 3.92, p = 0.060, and
a signiﬁcant main effect of face orientation, F(1, 23)= 24.98,
p< 0.001, with longer RTs for inverted than for upright faces.
Crucially, the interaction between condition and face orienta-
tion was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 23)< 1 (Figure 5A). Thus, the
FIE was signiﬁcant both for the CFS condition, t (23)= 2.69,
p = 0.013, and for the control condition, t (23)= 3.29, p = 0.003,
and the size of the FIE did not differ signiﬁcantly between both
conditions.
Hence,whenCFS and control trials weremixedwithin the same
blocks, both conditions yielded comparable FIE sizes. As the FIE
in the CFS condition was not larger than the FIE in a condition
intended to control for differences in detection thresholds or cri-
teria for upright and inverted faces, one would have to conclude
that in both conditions the FIE was mediated by a non-speciﬁc
detection advantage for upright faces. Thus, following the logic
of the b-CFS paradigm, the results from Experiment 2 provide
no evidence for CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing differences
between upright and inverted faces.
CFS vs. control condition
The increased FIE in the control condition was accompanied by a
change in the underlying RT distribution that now better approx-
imated the shape of the CFS distribution (Figure 6B). KS-tests
showed signiﬁcant differences (at the 10% level) between both
distributions in only nine out of 24 subjects. In comparison to
Experiment 1, the control distribution had more spread and a
FIGURE 5 | (A) Mean RTs and (B) mean CVs from Experiment 2.
longer right tail and now closely overlapped with the CFS distrib-
ution (Figure 6A).While the mean CV was still signiﬁcantly larger
in the CFS condition, t (23)= 6.41, p< 0.001 (Figure 5B), com-
pared to Experiment 1 the difference between the two conditions
was much reduced (compare Figure 5B to Figure 3B). Accord-
ingly,amixedANOVAwith thebetween subjects factor experiment
(1, 2) and condition (CFS, Control) on the mean CVs yielded a
signiﬁcant experiment-by-condition interaction,F(1, 46)= 93.88,
p< 0.001.
Furthermore, in Experiment 2 face inversion did not only shift
the distribution from the control condition rightwards, but also
increased the size of its right tail, thereby mimicking the effect
of face inversion on the CFS distribution (Figures 6B,C). This
impression was supported by linear regression analyses showing
that the slopes were positive for both the CFS and the con-
trol condition, F(1, 17)= 31.50, p< 0.001, and F(1, 17)= 15.56,
p< 0.001, respectively, while – in contrast to Experiment 1 –
there was no statistically signiﬁcant difference between the slopes,
F(1, 34)< 1. Thus, both in the CFS and in the control condi-
tion the FIE was now particularly pronounced for trials with
slow RTs.
Interpretation
We had hypothesized that a mixed design would reduce poten-
tial differences between conditions with regard to temporal
uncertainty or subjects’ strategies. Following this reasoning, the
convergence of the distributions may reﬂect a reduction of factors
that differed between the two conditions, such as temporal uncer-
tainty or subjects’ strategies. We would expect uncertainty and
strategies to inﬂuence primarily (although not exclusively) “post-
perceptual” factors related to decision making, response selection,
or response initiation. Clearly, the choice RT procedure employed
in the b-CFS paradigm is susceptible to inﬂuences from postper-
ceptual factors, such as different response criteria for upright and
inverted faces. It is important to note that the possible impact of
such non-perceptual factors may be limited to the comparison of
upright and inverted faces and does not necessarily apply to other
b-CFS studies using different stimuli. For example, it is difﬁcult
to imagine that observers would have different response criteria
for images of complex scenes that differed only in their semantic
content (Mudrik et al., 2011). By contrast, the greater familiarity
of upright faces could be associated with a more liberal response
criterion.
EXPERIMENT 3
To test this possibility, in Experiment 3 we again used a mixed
design but ruled out the potential inﬂuence of differential response
criteria. To that end, we ﬁxed display durations and measured
response accuracies instead of RTs, using a spatial two-alternative
forced-choice (2AFC) task without speed pressure. If the increased
FIE in the CFS condition reﬂected CFS-speciﬁc unconscious pro-
cessing differences while the increased FIE in the mixed design
control condition reﬂected postperceptual factors, in Experiment
3 we would expect a larger FIE in the CFS than in the control con-
dition. Alternatively, if both FIEs were caused by a non-speciﬁc
detection advantage for upright faces, we would expect FIEs of
similar size.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty observers (16 female, mean age 27.4 years) participated in
Experiment 3.
Procedure
Each trial started with a 1-s presentation of the ﬁxation cross and
the black frame only, followed by the face stimulus and the CFS
masks displayed for 500, 700, 1000, or 1500ms. In the CFS condi-
tion face contrast reached 50% in 500-ms displays, 70% in 700-ms
displays, and 100% in 1000 and 1500-ms displays. In the con-
trol condition, face transparency was 80% in 500-ms displays,
72% in 700-ms displays, 60% in 1000-ms displays, and 40% in
1500-ms displays. In both conditions, face stimulus presentation
was followed by three trailing masks, each presented for 100ms
binocularly to prevent afterimages.
At the end of the stimulus sequence, observers were prompted
to press the left or the right arrow key on the keyboard to indicate
as accurately as possible on which side of ﬁxation the face image
had been shown.No feedbackwas given. Participantswere encour-
aged to take as much time as they needed to make their responses.
Instructions informed observers that upright and inverted faces
would be presented during each trial and that in some trials only
parts of the faces might become visible.
Design
All participants were tested in two sessions separated by 1–3 days.
A single session consisted of 640 trials separated by nine breaks.
Within a session each combination of two conditions, two face
orientations, two eyes for face presentation, four presentation
durations, and ten face exemplars occurred with equal probability
and trial order was randomized.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Proportions of correct responses were analyzed by a repeated
measures ANOVA with the factors condition, face orientation,
and presentation duration (500, 700, 1000, 1500ms). Face detec-
tion accuracy increased with longer presentation durations, F(3,
57)= 193.64, p< 0.001. More importantly, there was a signiﬁ-
cant main effect of face orientation, F(1, 19)= 11.33, p = 0.003,
with higher accuracy for upright faces than for inverted faces (see
Figure 7). Neither the main effect of condition, F(1, 19)= 1.37,
p = 0.257, nor the interaction between condition and presentation
FIGURE 7 | Results from Experiment 3. Mean accuracies for upright and
inverted faces, presented separately for (A) the CFS condition and (B) the
control condition at each presentation duration. Error bars denote the 95%
conﬁdence interval for the paired comparison of upright and inverted faces
at the respective presentation duration.
FIGURE 6 | (A) Cumulative group distributions of RTs from the CFS and from the control condition in Experiment 2. (B,C) Size of the FIE as a function of
percentiles, plotted separately for the CFS and the control condition.
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duration, F(3, 57)= 1.59, p = 0.202, were signiﬁcant. Crucially,
no other interaction, including the condition-by-face orientation
interaction, approached signiﬁcance, all Fs< 1.
Thus, when the putative inﬂuence of differential response cri-
teria was eliminated we found a detection advantage for upright
faces that was independent of condition. Accordingly, the FIE in
the control condition reﬂected a lower detection threshold for
upright faces and cannot be ascribed simply to the inﬂuence of dif-
ferential response criteria or to other postperceptual factors. As the
FIE was not enlarged in the CFS condition, the results from Exper-
iment 3 suggest that shorter suppression durations for upright
faces reﬂected the same non-speciﬁc detection advantage in both
conditions and thus, consistent with the results of Experiment 2,
fail to provide evidence for CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing
differences between upright and inverted faces.
In summary, the results from Experiments 1–3 demonstrate a
detection advantage for upright faces that is not speciﬁc to CFS.
In all three experiments we found an upright face advantage in the
control condition. Still, in Experiment 1 the FIE in the control con-
dition was smaller than the FIE in the CFS condition, allowing the
possibility that CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing could have
contributed to the increased FIE. However, when CFS and control
trials were mixed within the same block (Experiment 2) and when
we measured detection accuracies instead of RTs (Experiment 3),
the FIE was similarly large in both conditions. Thus, to account for
different suppression durations in these experiments, it sufﬁces to
assume non-speciﬁc detection differences for upright and inverted
faces, and it is not necessary to postulate CFS-speciﬁc unconscious
processing differences.
EXPERIMENT 4
Taking the results of the previous experiments together, we found
no evidence for additional CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing
under b-CFS compared to the control condition when RT distrib-
utions of both conditions were matched (Experiment 2) and when
we controlled for effects of response criteria by using a 2AFC task
(Experiment 3). Before throwing the baby out with the bathwater,
we were interested whether it might nevertheless be possible to
ﬁnd evidence for CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing.
The previous experiments were designed to closely resemble
the experimental protocol and visual displays employed by Jiang
et al. (2007) and to yield similar overall suppression durations as
previous b-CFS studies on the FIE (Jiang et al., 2007; Zhou et al.,
2010a). Still, it is possible that CFS-speciﬁc unconscious effects are
indeed present, but cannot be increased beyond the size of non-
speciﬁc effects with such short suppression durations. As results
from other studies conducted in our laboratory (e.g., Stein et al.,
2011) indicated that longer overall suppression durations might
yield larger effects in the CFS condition, in the following experi-
ments we adjusted the display parameters to induce longer periods
of perceptual suppression. We asked whether longer suppression
durations would result in a larger FIE and whether this FIE would
be larger than the effect obtained in the control condition, despite
the use of a mixed design.
Furthermore, these additional experiments allowed us to test
whether mixing the CFS and the control condition would invari-
antly result in similar RT distributions for both conditions, as
suggested by Experiment 2. In addition to the comparison of RT
distributions, in Experiment 4 we tested whether the control con-
dition actually mimicked the perceptual experience during CFS, as
assumed by all previous b-CFS studies that relied on the compar-
ison with a control condition to infer CFS-speciﬁc unconscious
processing. To that end, we had participants judge their subjective
impression of face appearance after each trial.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Fourteen observers (nine female,mean age 24.5 years) participated
in Experiment 4.
Apparatus and stimuli
For Experiments 4 (as well as for Experiments 5 and 6), the visual
displays were slightly modiﬁed (Figure 8). To further facilitate sta-
ble binocular fusion, fusion contours (width 0.5˚) consisting of
randomly arranged black and white pixels were drawn within the
frames (10.9˚× 10.9˚) presented to each eye. In order to induce
longer periods of perceptual suppression, we generated another
variant of Mondrian-like CFS masks (10.4˚ × 10.4˚) consisting of
colored, randomly arranged circles (diameter 0.4˚–1.8˚; similar to
the masks used by Tsuchiya et al., 2009). During pilot testing, these
masks suppressed stimuli for longer periods than those employed
in the previous experiments.
Procedure
The face stimuli were always centered at a horizontal distance of
3.9˚ either to the left or to the right of the ﬁxation cross, at a
random vertical position relative to the ﬁxation cross (maximum
vertical center-to-center distance 2.9˚).We now included three dif-
ferent control conditions that differed with regard to the length of
the transparency ramp. In the 8.5-s ramp control condition, face
transparency was reduced from 100 to 0% within 8.5 s. In the
2.5-s ramp control condition, this transparency ramp lasted 2.5 s.
Finally, we also included a no-ramp control condition in which
the face was displayed binocularly at full contrast at a randomly
selected time point (0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 3.5, or 5.0 s after trial onset; cf.
Sterzer et al., 2011).
As in Experiments 1 and 2, participants’ primary task was to
indicate as fast and as accurately as possible the side of ﬁxation
on which the face stimulus or any part of the face appeared, using
the left or the right arrow key on the keyboard. In addition, par-
ticipants judged their subjective impression of face appearance
at the end of each trial. After indicating face location, partici-
pants were prompted to judge how abrupt the face had appeared
by pressing a key from 1 to 4, with 1 meaning abrupt and 4
meaning gradual face appearance. Instructions emphasized that
this “abruptness rating” represented a secondary task and that
localization responses should under no circumstances be decel-
erated or withheld in order to better judge the abruptness of face
appearance. Participants were encouraged to follow their spon-
taneous impressions when judging abruptness and to guess if
necessary.
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FIGURE 8 | Schematics of example trials from (A) the CFS condition and
(B) the control condition in Experiments 4–6 in which we employed a
new set of masks that induced longer periods of perceptual suppression
in the CFS condition. In Experiments 4 and 5, we used a speeded
localization task as in Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 6, display
presentation durations were ﬁxed and the localization task was unspeeded,
as in Experiment 3.
FIGURE 9 | (A) Mean RTs and (B) mean CVs from Experiment 4. “Control 1” refers to the 8.5-s ramp, “Control 2” refers to the 2.5-s ramp, and “Control 3”
refers to the no-ramp control condition.
Design
Experiment 4 consisted of 320 trials (separated by three breaks).
Each combination of four conditions (CFS, three control condi-
tions), two face orientations, two eyes for face presentation, and
ten face exemplars was presented equally often and trial order was
randomized.
Analysis
Trials with incorrect responses (less than 4% of all trials for each
subject) and CFS trials with RTs longer than 15 s (compared to
Experiments 1 and 2 we extended the cut-off by 5 s to account
for the prolonged overall suppression durations) as well as CFS
trials in which the face went undetected (13.8%) were discarded.
Overall, 95.5% of all trials were included in the analyses.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Upright vs. inverted faces
A repeated measures ANOVA on mean RTs with the factors condi-
tion (CFS, three control conditions) and face orientation yielded
a signiﬁcant main effect of condition, F(3, 39)= 41.80, p< 0.001,
a signiﬁcant main effect of face orientation, F(1, 13)= 19.78,
p< 0.001, and, importantly, a signiﬁcant interaction between
condition and face orientation, F(3, 39)= 13.94, p< 0.001. The
FIE was signiﬁcant in the CFS condition, t (13)= 4.01, p = 0.001,
and in the 8.5-s ramp control condition, t (13)= 2.46, p = 0.029,
but neither in the 2.5-s ramp control condition nor in the no-ramp
control condition, both t (13)< 1 (see Figure 9A). Crucially, the
FIE was signiﬁcantly larger in the CFS condition than in the 8.5-s
ramp control condition, F(1, 13)= 14.18, p = 0.002.
Thus, longer overall suppression duration resulted in a larger
FIE compared to the CFS conditions in the previous experiments
(compare Figure 9A to Figures 3A and 5A) and this FIE exceeded
the effect obtained in the control condition, despite the use of a
mixed design. According to the b-CFS logic, the increased FIE in
the CFS condition in Experiment 4 would provide evidence for
CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing differences between upright
and inverted faces, contrary to the results of Experiments 2 and 3.
CFS vs. control condition
We next tested whether the mixed design used in Experiment 4
attenuated differences between the RT distributions from the CFS
and the control condition, as in Experiment 2, or whether the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 167 | 10
Stein et al. Breaking continuous ﬂash suppression
increased FIE in the CFS condition was accompanied by marked
differences between the RT distributions from both conditions, as
in the blocked design in Experiment 1. KS-tests yielded signiﬁcant
differences between the CFS distribution and the 8.5-s ramp con-
trol distribution for each individual subject (all p< 0.01). As in
Experiment 1, the CFS distribution had more spread and a longer
right tail (Figure 10A), the mean CV was greatly enhanced in the
CFS condition, t (13)= 11.99,p< 0.001 (Figure 9B), and the effect
of face inversion strongly increased toward the right tail of the CFS
distribution (compare Figures 10B,C).
Thus, using a mixed design as in Experiment 2 is not sufﬁcient
to eliminate differences between experimental and control con-
dition in RT distributions. As discussed for Experiment 1, these
considerable distributional differences could indicate that the con-
trol condition did not reproduce all relevant factors that might
have played a role in the CFS condition.
Subjective face appearance
The concern that the control condition did not represent a good
analog of the CFS condition was borne out by participants’ ratings
of subjective face appearance. Mean abruptness ratings signiﬁ-
cantly differed between the four presentation conditions, F(3,
39)= 104.25, p< 0.001 (see Figure 11). To test whether one of
the control conditions yielded a subjective impression of face
appearance comparable to the CFS condition, we compared the
mean ratings between the CFS condition and the three control
conditions. Face appearance in the 8.5-s ramp control condi-
tion was judged to be more gradual than in the CFS condition,
t (13)=−7.15, p< 0.001. Even the 2.5-s ramp control condition
that yielded much shorter overall RTs (see Figure 9) generated a
more gradual impression of face appearance than the CFS condi-
tion, t (13)=−2.39, p = 0.033. Conversely, face appearance in the
no-ramp control condition was rated as being more abrupt than
in the CFS condition, t (13)= 8.74, p< 0.001.
Thus, none of the control conditions included in Experiment
4 could match the CFS condition in the subjective abruptness of
face experience. Progressive fading-in of the face stimulus as in
most previous b-CFS studies (Jiang et al., 2007; Costello et al.,
2009; Zhou et al., 2010a; Mudrik et al., 2011; Stein et al., 2011;
Yang and Yeh, 2011) led to the impression of a more gradual face
appearance. Furthermore, the comparison to the no-ramp con-
trol condition revealed that breakthrough from suppression was
not “all-or-none,” i.e., it was not experienced as the sudden pres-
ence of a previously fully absent percept. This may reﬂect the
perception of extended transition periods in which neither the
mask nor the face achieved full dominance. Indeed, during con-
ventional BR,observers frequently experience transitionperiods in
which a compoundof both stimuli is perceived, either piecemeal or
superimposed (e.g., Blake et al., 1992; Yang et al., 1992), and these
transition periods can be in the order of seconds (Brascamp et al.,
2006).Mimicking the subjective perception during such transition
periods in a binocular control condition appears difﬁcult if not
impossible (an issue we will return to in the General Discussion).
Interpretation
In summary, inducing longer periods of perceptual suppression
led to a large FIE in the CFS condition that exceeded the effect
obtained in the control condition. We can only speculate about
FIGURE 11 | Rating of subjective face appearance in Experiment 4. Bar
plots denote participants’ mean ratings of the abruptness of face
appearance (from 1 abrupt to 4 gradual). “Control 1” refers to the 8.5-s
ramp, “Control 2” refers to the 2.5-s ramp, and “Control 3” refers to the
no-ramp control condition. Positive and negative error bars represent 95%
conﬁdence intervals for the paired comparison between the CFS condition
and the respective control condition.
FIGURE 10 | (A) Cumulative group distributions of RTs from the CFS and from the 8.5-s ramp control condition in Experiment 4. (B,C) Size of the FIE as a
function of percentiles, plotted separately for the CFS and the 8.5-s ramp control condition.
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the cause of the apparent relationship between overall suppression
durations andFIE size,one possible reasonbeingunconscious pro-
cessing differences unfolding successively over longer periods of
invisibility. However, a caveat to this interpretation is that both the
analysis of RT distributions as well as the subjective rating of face
appearance revealed marked differences between the CFS and the
control condition, as in Experiment 1. Therefore, the comparison
of both conditions does not necessarily isolateCFS-speciﬁc uncon-
scious processing, but could reﬂect any other process differentially
engaged by the CFS and the control condition.
In contrast to Experiment 2, implementing a mixed design did
not lead to a convergence of theRTdistributions from the two con-
ditions. In Experiment 4, longer overall durations of perceptual
suppression resulted in a proportional increase in RT variability,
whereas in the transparency ramp control conditions RT vari-
ability tended to be even lower than in Experiment 2 (compare
Figures 5B and 9B).We had hypothesized that the similarity of RT
distributions seen in Experiment 2 could have reﬂected a reduc-
tion of differences between conditions, perhaps related to face
predictability, subjects’ strategies or response criteria. Following
this reasoning, the divergence of RT distributions in Experiment
4 suggests that a mixed design is not always successful in reducing
such differences.We can only speculate about this discrepancy, one
possibility being that the overall prolonged duration of the CFS
trials in Experiment 4 left sufﬁcient time for subjects to consciously
adjust their response strategy.
In the ﬁnal two experiments, we addressed these concerns. In
Experiment 5, we again tried to match RT distributions of the CFS
and control condition as in Experiment 2 and made face appear-
ance in the control condition less predictable by implementing a
wide range of different transparency ramps. In Experiment 6, we
used an unspeeded spatial 2AFC task similar to Experiment 3 to
rule out the potential impact of different response criteria.
EXPERIMENT 5
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A new group of 14 observers (nine female, mean age 25.2 years)
participated in Experiment 5. One subject was excluded from the
analysis due to data loss (computer error in recording the log ﬁle).
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure
While the CFS condition was identical to Experiment 4, in the
control condition we now implemented a range of different trans-
parency ramps. To increase variability in face appearance, for each
subject 40 different ramp durations were randomly drawn from
an ex-Gaussian distribution which typically provides an excellent
ﬁt to RT data from a wide range of experiments (e.g., Hockley,
1984; Heathcote et al., 1991). The parameters for this ex-Gaussian
distribution (μ= 4.9 s, σ = 7.3 s, τ= 12.2 s) were selected based
on pilot testing. Ramp durations shorter than 250ms were set to
250ms to replace negative values. The 10 face exemplars were then
randomly assigned to the 40 different ramps, such that both the
upright and the inverted version of a given face exemplar were
presented using the same ramp durations.
Design
There were 160 trials (separated by one break): each combina-
tion of two conditions, two face orientations, two eyes for face
presentation, and ten face exemplars occurred equally often and
trial order was randomized.
Analysis
Trials with incorrect responses (less than 3% of all trials for each
subject) and CFS trials with RTs longer than 15 s as well as CFS
trials in which the face went undetected (10.9%) were discarded.
In total, 92.3% of all trials were included in the analyses.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Upright vs. inverted faces
A repeated measures ANOVA with the factors condition and
face orientation yielded a signiﬁcant main effect of condition,
F(1, 12)= 5.93, p = 0.031, with somewhat shorter RTs in the
control condition, and a signiﬁcant main effect of face orienta-
tion, F(1, 12)= 20.67, p< 0.001, as well as a signiﬁcant inter-
action between condition and face orientation, F(1, 12)= 14.45,
p< 0.001. While the FIE was signiﬁcant not only in the CFS con-
dition, t (12)= 4.91, p = 0.001, but also in the control condition,
t (12)= 2.40, p = 0.033, the FIE was again signiﬁcantly larger in
the CFS condition (see Figure 12A).
CFS vs. control condition
Before turning to the comparison of the RTdistributions, it should
be noted that in contrast to the previous experiments in which
stimuli were presented in the same manner in each trial from
a given condition, in Experiment 5 RTs in the control condi-
tion were artiﬁcially spread by the different ramp durations that
varied from trial to trial. KS-tests revealed signiﬁcant differences
between the CFS and the control distributions for all but one sub-
ject (all p< 0.05). While the implementation of variable ramps
increased RT variability in the control condition to a level close
to the variability in the CFS condition (Figures 12B and 13A),
the mean CV was still signiﬁcantly larger in the CFS condition,
t (12)= 2.75, p = 0.018. Finally, as in the previous experiments
the effect of face inversion increased toward the right tail of the
CFS distribution, while no clear trend was seen in the control
condition (Figures 13B,C). Correspondingly, linear regression
analyses revealed that while the slopes were positive for both the
CFS, F(1, 17)= 282.70, p< 0.001, and the control condition, F(1,
17)= 15.49, p = 0.001, there was a signiﬁcant difference between
the slopes, F(1, 34)= 81.85, p< 0.001.
FIGURE 12 | (A) Mean RTs and (B) mean CVs from Experiment 5.
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FIGURE 13 | (A) Cumulative group distributions of RTs from the CFS and from the control condition in Experiment 5. (B,C) Size of the FIE as a function of
percentiles, plotted separately for the CFS, and the control condition.
In summary, although we failed to fully match both condi-
tions in RT distributions, compared to the previous experiments
RT variability was greatly enhanced in the control condition of
Experiment 5, thus reducing predictability of face appearance.
Nevertheless, the FIEwas still considerably larger in theCFS condi-
tion, suggesting that stimulus predictability may not be the critical
factor underlying the enhanced effect under CFS.
EXPERIMENT 6
PARTICIPANTS
Thirteen new participants (eight female,mean age 23.7 years) took
part in Experiment 6.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure
In Experiment 6, we ﬁxed presentation durations to measure face
localization accuracies using an unspeeded 2AFC task (which was
identical to Experiment 3). Apart from this, Experiment 6 was
identical to Experiment 4, except that for the control condition
we used the settings from the 8.5-s ramp control condition only.
In the CFS condition, face stimuli were always presented to the
subjects’ dominant eye (to reduce the length of the experiment by
shortening overall suppression durations), as determined by the
Miles (1930) test.
For each of the four conditions (CFS upright, CFS inverted,
Control upright, Control inverted) presentation durations were
adjusted continuously by adaptive staircases using 1 up 3 down
rules with ﬁxed step sizes of 500ms, with the constraint that
presentation duration was not allowed to fall below 500ms or
to exceed 15 s. To prevent afterimages, each face presentation
sequence was followed by six trailing CFS masks consisting of
slightly smaller and differently colored circles.
At the beginning of each session participants completed a short
RT block identical to Experiment 4 but containing 24 trials (12
CFS, 12 Control trials) only. The mean RTs (rounded to the next
500ms) from the CFS and the control condition were then taken
as initial values for the CFS and the control staircases, respectively.
Design
Participants completed 480 trials (separated by ﬁve breaks) in
which each combination of two conditions, two face orientations,
and ten face exemplars occurred equally often. Trial order was
randomized, meaning that the four staircases were randomly
interleaved.
Analysis
For each of the four staircases, we determined a threshold esti-
mate by averaging all trials on which a reversal of the presentation
duration occurred (other methods for calculating the threshold
yielded virtually identical results). One extreme outlying subject
(threshold estimates in the CFS condition: 3.48 s for upright faces,
8.66 s for inverted faces) was excluded from the analysis.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A repeatedmeasuresANOVAon the threshold estimates revealed a
trend toward a signiﬁcantmain effect of condition,F(1,11)= 4.79,
p = 0.051, a signiﬁcant main effect of face orientation, F(1,
11)= 7.13, p = 0.022, and a signiﬁcant interaction between con-
dition and face orientation, F(1, 11)= 18.64, p = 0.001. Figure 14
shows that in the CFS condition thresholds were signiﬁcantly
lower for upright than for inverted faces, t (11)=−4.58,p = 0.001,
while there was no signiﬁcant threshold difference in the control
condition, t (11)= 1.19, p = 0.260.
These results show that the large FIE observed in Experiments
4 and 5 cannot be explained solely by different response criteria
for upright and inverted faces. However, in contrast to the previ-
ous experiments, in Experiment 6 we for the ﬁrst time obtained
no signiﬁcant FIE in the control condition. Possibly, the relatively
large ﬁxed step size of the staircases was suboptimal for detect-
ing threshold differences in the control condition. For example,
it is conceivable that performance at a given presentation dura-
tion was at ceiling for both upright and inverted faces (i.e., face
transparency was too low), whereas a 500-ms decrement in the
presentation duration might have yielded ﬂoor effects (i.e., face
transparency was too high).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the present study, we evaluated the validity of the b-CFS par-
adigm for studying unconscious processing during interocular
suppression, using the effect of face inversion as an example. Ini-
tially invisible upright faces were detected faster under CFS than
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FIGURE 14 | Results from Experiment 6. Mean threshold estimates for
upright and inverted faces. Positive and negative error bars denote the 95%
conﬁdence intervals for the paired comparisons between upright and
inverted faces within each condition.
inverted faces (Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 5), replicating previous
reports. Also in accuracy-based measures using unspeeded 2AFC
tasks (Experiments 3 and 6) we found an advantage for upright
faces in overcoming CFS, meaning that differential response crite-
ria for upright and inverted faces cannot account for the effect.
However, detection differences under CFS do not necessarily
have to reﬂect unconscious effects under suppression, or differ-
ential CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing, but could also be due
to more general differences not speciﬁc to the method of CFS
(Figure 1).
To infer CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing, it is neces-
sary to rely on the comparison of the CFS condition to the
results from the binocular control condition which is supposed
to index non-speciﬁc threshold differences. We found an FIE
in the control condition in ﬁve out of the six experiments, but
in all but one experiment this effect was smaller than in the
CFS condition. Assuming that the comparison between detec-
tion differences measured in both conditions isolated CFS-speciﬁc
unconscious processing, the increased FIE under CFS would
provide evidence for CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing differ-
ences. However, this conclusion depends entirely on the premise
that the comparison between the CFS and the control con-
dition does indeed isolate CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing
and does not reﬂect any other factors that might differ between
conditions.
ARE THE CFS AND THE CONTROL CONDITION COMPARABLE?
As no previous b-CFS study actually considered the truth of this
premise, here we made a ﬁrst attempt to explore whether there
might be other differences rather than CFS-speciﬁc unconscious
processing between the CFS and the control condition. In three
out of the four RT experiments we found a larger FIE in the CFS
condition, but also marked differences between the RT distribu-
tions from both conditions, with much greater RT variability and
a larger proportion of trials with very long RTs in the CFS con-
dition. Only in Experiment 2 where RT distributions were more
comparable, we found an FIE of the same size in both conditions.
The distinct characteristics of the CFS and the control distribu-
tions may point to differences in the underlying perceptual and
cognitive processes, for example reﬂecting reduced predictabil-
ity of stimulus appearance and greater uncertainty in the CFS
condition.
Are we suggesting that we only need (approximately) matched
RT distributions in order to draw valid conclusions from the
comparison between the CFS and the control condition? Cer-
tainly this would not be sufﬁcient. In fact, previous b-CFS studies
used the method of blending stimuli binocularly into the CFS
masks as the control condition in order to mimic the perceptual
experience (cf. Jiang et al., 2007) induced by the CFS condi-
tion. However, whether both conditions are indeed perceptually
matched or at least perceptually similar had never been tested.
The results from Experiment 4 speak against this assumption,
revealing that gradual stimulus fade-in is subjectively consider-
ably different than emergence from CFS. It is important to note
that this “abruptness rating” measured only one particular aspect
of an indeﬁnite number of possible perceptual experiences. Fur-
ther (unpublished) observations from our laboratory revealed
even larger differences in rating scores when subjects were asked
to judge their subjective impression of a stimulus feature that
physically differed between both condition, such as the faces’
transparency.
Ideally, one would want to show that both conditions are
matchedperceptually in all aspects of perceptual experience,which
seems virtually impossible to achieve in practice, given that the fac-
tors governing the perceptual differences between both conditions
are unknown. A less rigorous but more practical alternative for
future b-CFS studies would be to demonstrate that subjects can-
not distinguish between the CFS and the control condition, for
example using a two-interval forced-choice task, asking subjects
which of both instances was the CFS condition. Unfortunately,
fromour experimental experience it appears difﬁcult if not impos-
sible to design a control condition that mimics the perceptual
experience under CFS in the sense that it cannot be discriminated
from the b-CFS condition. In particular, it would be very challeng-
ing to accurately model the perceptual transitions associated with
breakthrough from CFS.
To conclude, the present ﬁndings of striking differences
between CFS and control – not only with respect to FIE, but
also regarding a number of other factors – seriously challenge
the fundamental premise of the b-CFS paradigm, namely that
the two conditions differ only with regard to CFS-speciﬁc uncon-
scious processing, and hence cast doubt on the notion that b-CFS
can provide unequivocal evidence for CFS-speciﬁc unconscious
processing.
DO LARGE B-CFS EFFECTS PROVE CFS-SPECIFIC UNCONSCIOUS
PROCESSING?
It should be noted that our concerns relate only to the valid-
ity of the conclusions drawn from the b-CFS paradigm, while
they do not categorically rule out the possibility that CFS-speciﬁc
unconscious processing differences did play a role in mediat-
ing the advantage of upright faces in overcoming CFS. The size
of the FIE varied enormously depending on the strength of
suppression inducedby theCFSmasks, ranging fromabout 150ms
for short overall suppression durations (Experiments 1 and 2)
to more than 850ms for longer overall periods of suppression,
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far exceeding the FIE obtained in the control condition (Experi-
ments 4 and 5). On the face of it, it may appear straightforward
to explain the sheer size of the difference between the effects
in the CFS and the control condition with CFS-speciﬁc uncon-
scious processing above and beyond the “normal” stream of visual
processing.
However, because the CFS and the control condition are not
truly comparable, the mere difference in FIE size is not sufﬁ-
cient to infer CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing. From other
paradigms, it is well-known that apparently small changes in the
experimental protocol or visual displays yield dramatically dif-
ferent effects. For example, the effect of inversion on detecting
a face in visual search displays ranges from about 20ms (Lewis
and Edmonds, 2005) to nearly 1000ms (Garrido et al., 2008),
depending on target–distractor similarity. Similarly, large effect
size differences between the CFS and the control condition could
be due to a variety of differences between the two conditions other
than unconscious processing during interocular suppression. To
illustrate, consider a control condition in which stimuli at full
contrast are popped in on top of the CFS masks at various
points in time, as in the no-ramp control condition of Experi-
ment 4. In principle, this could also be considered a condition
that controls for non-speciﬁc threshold differences between the
two conditions (e.g., upright and inverted faces). Yet, most pre-
vious b-CFS studies did not implement such a no-ramp control
condition, presumably because it is more obvious that this condi-
tion does not perceptually resemble the CFS condition and, when
comparing RTs to different stimuli, most likely produces ﬂoor
effects.
That being said, we are not aware of any a priori reason to
suppose that gradual blending stimuli into the masks would avoid
ﬂoor effects or constitute a better perceptual analog of the CFS
condition. In fact, the rating results from Experiment 4 indicate
that both the no-ramp and the transparency ramp control condi-
tion fail to mimic the subjective impression of breakthrough from
suppression. Thus, just as the transparency rampcontrol condition
is a more sensitive measure of differences in stimulus detectabil-
ity than the no-ramp control condition (Experiment 4), the CFS
condition could be regarded as an even more sensitive measure of
non-speciﬁc differences in stimulus detectability.
We can only speculate about potential reasons for these differ-
ences between conditions in their sensitivity to detection thresh-
old differences. Again, the comparison of the no-ramp and the
transparency ramp control condition may serve as an illustra-
tion. When popping in stimuli on top of the masks, the time
window in which sensory evidence is sufﬁciently weak or ambigu-
ous to allow detection threshold differences between stimuli
to unfold is very short. Presumably, transparency ramps were
implemented in previous b-CFS control conditions not only
in an attempt to perceptually approximate the CFS condition,
but also to avoid ﬂoor effects by widening this temporal win-
dow. However, gradual blending stimuli into the masks also
yields only a narrow time window in which the transparency
ramp reaches values that are appropriate for measuring thresh-
old differences. While this may explain the weak or even absent
effects in the control conditions, an important question for
future research will be to pinpoint the perceptual mechanisms
underlying the heightened sensitivity of the CFS condition, con-
sidering CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing as only one possible
explanation.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
To summarize,our study demonstrates that the b-CFSparadigm in
its current form cannot provide unequivocal evidence for uncon-
scious processing during interocular suppression. While our ﬁnd-
ings do not categorically exclude the possibility that CFS-speciﬁc
unconscious processing might be involved in mediating break-
through from suppression, the striking differences between the
CFS and the control condition preclude deﬁnite conclusions based
on the comparison of the two conditions. Although we focused on
the effect of face inversion as an example, these concerns equally
apply to b-CFS experiments that inferred differential uncon-
scious processing during interocular suppression for other sets
of stimuli. As these conclusions rested on the untested (and most
likely unwarranted) premise that the CFS and the control con-
dition differed with regard to CFS-speciﬁc unconscious process-
ing only, differences between stimuli in overcoming suppression
revealed by previous b-CFS studies should be reconsidered, taking
into account that non-speciﬁc differences in detection thresh-
olds rather than CFS-speciﬁc unconscious processing might have
caused these effects.
Future b-CFS studies aimed at uncovering unconscious pro-
cessing under interocular suppression should take great care
in ensuring that the control condition does indeed represent
an appropriate analog of the CFS condition and that the two
conditions differ only with regard to CFS-speciﬁc unconscious
processing. If the CFS and the control condition cannot be
matched, one can only speculate about a potential role of CFS-
speciﬁc unconscious processing, but no deﬁnite conclusions can
be drawn.
However, for researchers primarily interested in measuring
differences in the detectability of visual stimuli, regardless of
unconscious processing differences speciﬁcally tied to interocular
suppression, b-CFS clearly is a technique that offers unique sensi-
tivity for measuring detection threshold differences. In the tradi-
tion of the New Look school of perception (Bruner, 1957), such
threshold differences were considered as ameasure of unconscious
processing, because faster detection can only happen when the
visual system discriminates stimuli before detection, i.e., uncon-
sciously. Recently, this approach has been revived, for example in
research on perceptual defense vs. vigilance for emotional words
(Dijksterhuis and Aarts, 2003), and has been proposed to have
greater sensitivity to unconscious processing than the dissociation
paradigm (Gaillard et al., 2006). Applying b-CFS in this way obvi-
ates the need for creating a tediously designed control condition
(see Figure 1), and equips researchers with a powerful and highly
sensitive device to probe potency of visual stimuli to gain access
to awareness.
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